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What We Know About the Impacts 





This chapter briefly reviews the recent literature that seeks to evalu-
ate employment and training programs, as well as important older pa-
pers. We focus on the question of whether the programs have measur-
able and economically relevant impacts on labor market outcomes. 
We do not focus on the economics of such programs but do lean on 
the “dismal science” when interpreting the findings in the literature. We 
also do not focus on the econometrics of program evaluation, though 
our views about the credibility of various combinations of econometric 
strategies and data affect our choice of which evaluations to highlight 
and how we interpret the overall literature.
Readers interested in more in-depth surveys of the substantive lit-
erature should consult Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999). Smith 
(2000, 2004) provides a relatively nontechnical guide to the evaluation 
literature, while Abbring and Heckman (2007); Angrist and Krueger 
(1999); Friedlander, Greenberg, and Robins (1997); Heckman, LaLonde, 
and Smith (1999); Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a,b); and Imbens and 
Wooldridge (forthcoming) provide technical overviews.
EVALUATIONS OF THE MAJOR U.S. FEDERAL PROGRAMS
Employment and training programs in the United States have a rela-
tively brief history. In addition to the public employment programs of 
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the Great Depression, the Manpower Development and Training Act 
(MDTA, 1962–1972), the Comprehensive Employment and Train-
ing Act (CETA, 1973–1982), the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA, 
1982–1998), and the Workforce Investment Act (WIA, 1998–present) 
have provided vocational training, along with remedial education, sub-
sidized on-the-job training, and job search assistance to disadvantaged 
youth and adults as well as displaced workers. CETA also provided 
public service employment.
Perry et al. (1975) review the literature on the MDTA. Except for 
Ashenfelter (1978), this literature largely reflects the nascent stage of 
evaluation methodology at the time. The U.S. Department of Labor 
(USDOL) funded a number of evaluations of the CETA program, all 
of which relied on the same data source, the Continuous Longitudi-
nal Manpower Survey (CLMS), which combined random samples of 
participants with nonexperimental comparison group data from the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) and included matched calendar year 
Social Security earnings data for both groups. Barnow (1987) sum-
marizes these nonexperimental evaluations, which relied largely on 
crude matching estimators or difference-in-differences strategies, and 
obtained widely varying estimates. The sensitivity of the difference-in-
differences estimates in the CETA studies to the choice of the “before” 
period foreshadows a similar finding in Heckman and Smith (1999). 
Despite the high-quality (but only annual) administrative outcome data, 
the CLMS lacked the detailed information on local labor markets found 
to be important in Heckman et al. (1998) as well as the information on 
recent labor market and program participation choices (at a fine level 
of temporal detail) found to be important in Card and Sullivan (1988); 
Dolton, Azevedo, and Smith (2006); and Heckman et al. (1998).
The wide variety of CETA estimates led to a decision by the USDOL 
to evaluate the JTPA using a social experiment, called the National 
JTPA Study (NJS), which operated at a nonrandom sample of 16 (of 
about 600) local JTPA sites from approximately November 1987 to 
September 1989. Doolittle and Traeger (1990) describe the details of 
the experiment, and Bloom et al. (1997) and Orr et al. (1996) present 
the results. The NJS included disadvantaged adults and out-of-school 
youth but not in-school youth and dislocated workers.
The U.S. General Accounting Office (USGAO 1996) provides im-
pact estimates for five years after random assignment based on Social 
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Security earnings data. The USGAO finds stable impacts of around 
$800 a year for adult (22 and older) men and women, but these impacts 
lose statistical significance over time. In contrast, the estimates for male 
and female youth remain near zero throughout the follow-up period. 
The NJS found substantial treatment-group nonparticipation (around 40 
percent) and control group substitution (also around 40 percent) into 
alternative providers of similar services. As a result, these estimates ap-
proximate (because of differences in service intensity between the treat-
ment and control groups) what Imbens and Angrist (1994) call local av-
erage treatment effects: average impacts on those who receive services 
if assigned to the treatment group but who would not have received 
JTPA services if assigned to the control group. Heckman, LaLonde, and 
Smith (1999, Table 20) show that JTPA produced a net social benefit for 
adults but not for youth, generally irrespective of (reasonable) assump-
tions about benefit duration beyond five years, the discount rate, or the 
welfare cost of taxation. 
Mueser, Troske, and Gorislavsky (2007) employ modern matching 
methods, as described in, for example, Smith and Todd (2005), com-
bined with relatively rich administrative data, to estimate the earnings 
impact of JTPA in Missouri for program years 1994 and 1995, using a 
comparison group of individuals registering with the Employment Ser-
vice. In real terms, their preferred estimates resemble those from the 
NJS. 
Finally, although the WIA program has been operating nationwide 
since July 2000, there exist no published econometric evaluations. In 
2008, the USDOL funded a random assignment evaluation of WIA.
EVALUATIONS OF SELECTED OTHER U.S. PROGRAMS
Job Corps
Job Corps, established in 1964, provides intensive and comprehen-
sive services, including vocational and academic activities as well as 
support services, to about 60,000 disadvantaged youth, ages 16–24, in 
119 residential centers. The program has had two major evaluations: 
a thoughtful, nonexperimental evaluation in the 1970s, summarized 
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in Long, Mallar, and Thornton (1981), and an experimental evalua-
tion in the 1990s, summarized in Schochet, Burghardt, and McConnell 
(2006). The two have remarkably parallel findings; we focus on the 
experiment.
The first key finding is that removing disadvantaged young men 
from their local neighborhood dramatically reduces their criminal be-
havior in the short run. Second, there is a notable effect on educational 
attainment in the short run, measured in terms of hours, literacy and 
numeracy, and GED and vocational certificate receipt. Third, the Job 
Corps program generates substantial sustained earnings impacts for 20- 
to 24-year-old participants, but not for younger participants. As a result, 
because of its high cost, the program does not come close to passing 
a cost-benefit test (which includes the impacts on crime) for younger 
participants but does come close for the 20- to 24-year-olds. Despite 
the lack of an efficiency justification for the program, at least for the 
20- to 24-year-olds it actually has a substantial impact on labor market 
outcomes, which puts it well ahead of many other youth programs, such 
as JTPA, where the impacts equaled approximately zero.
Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services
The Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) system 
assigns mandatory reemployment services to new Unemployment In-
surance (UI) claimants predicted to have long spells of UI receipt or 
high probabilities of UI benefit exhaustion. A desire to proactively serve 
UI claimants likely to exhaust their benefits early in their benefit spells, 
rather than waiting to serve them until after they have experienced a 
long spell, motivates the program. The WPRS poses two separate eval-
uation problems. First, what effect do the mandatory services have on 
those who receive them and, second, how well does the existing system, 
which is based on predicted labor market outcomes in the absence of 
the mandatory services, do at allocating such services?
We know of two evaluations that address the first question. Dick-
inson, Decker, and Kreutzer (2002) summarize the results of a larger 
project that includes linear selection-on-observables estimates of the 
impact of WPRS referral on weeks and amount of UI received as well 
as earnings and employment for six states. They find substantively 
important and statistically significant impacts on the UI variables but 
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no systematic effects on labor market outcomes; this suggests that the 
WPRS system reduces UI usage without imposing a large cost on re-
ferred claimants via lower-quality job matches, although neither does 
the program provide any benefits to the recipients.
More recently, using data from Kentucky and exploiting the par-
ticular institutional features of the profiling system in that state, Black 
et al. (2003) provide experimental evidence of the impact of the re-
employment services requirement on claimants who are on the margin 
for the service requirement, given their employment histories and local 
area characteristics. They find that the program has a substantial effect 
relative to its (very small) cost, with that effect consisting largely of a 
deterrent effect, whereby some claimants immediately find employment 
upon receiving notice of the requirement that they receive services.
Black et al. (2003) also address the second question, and they find 
little difference in the impacts by profiling score. Keeping in mind the 
relative imprecision of their estimates, this suggests that the existing 
allocation mechanism does not advance economic efficiency. Pope and 
Sydnor (2007) argue that the existing mechanism fails on normative 
grounds as well, though their argument hinges critically on the view 
that the WPRS treatment represents a burden rather than a benefit.
EMPLOYER-FOCUSED PROGRAMS
Although it might sound obvious that workforce programs should 
focus on the labor demand side as well as the labor supply side, until 
recently there has been a disproportionate emphasis on the latter. In this 
section we briefly review the literature on three approaches to employ-
er-focused programs: on-the job training (OJT), customized training, 
and sectoral training.
On-the-Job Training
Subsidized on-the-job training (OJT) at private firms dates back at 
least to MDTA. This service provides a (typically 50 percent) wage 
subsidy for a limited period (typically six months) to firms hiring and 
informally training certain specified types of workers. Program staff 
168   Barnow and Smith
members recruit firms to provide OJT positions (a time-consuming 
task), and firms always retain the right to reject candidates prior to hir-
ing and to dismiss workers during or after the subsidy period. Though 
the training provided is supposed to exceed that provided to other new 
workers, anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that OJT recipients often 
receive the same training as unsubsidized workers (and, in some cases, 
little or no training at all).
Subsidized OJT has several rationales. The wage subsidy compo-
nent seeks the purely redistributional goal of getting employers to try 
out workers who may appear more risky because of weak labor market 
histories or other problems. As the OJT participants are not considered 
regular employees, employers are more willing to risk hiring them be-
cause if the OJT participants are let go at the end of the OJT period, it is 
not the same as terminating a regular worker. Tying training by the firm 
to the wage subsidy aims to increase the skills of workers lacking the 
resources or credit to obtain training either directly from providers or 
indirectly from firms via lower wages (where the minimum wage may 
also limit the ability of workers to trade lower wages for training).
Most evaluations suggest positive impacts of OJT on participant 
employment and earnings. For example, Barnow’s (1987) review of 
the CETA evaluations finds OJT to have greater impacts than all other 
service types. The NJS provides suggestive evidence on this point as 
well. However, OJT impacts likely embody more displacement than 
impacts for classroom training and other services that focus exclusively 
on increasing human capital and not also on redistributing jobs. As a 
result, partial equilibrium estimates like those noted here do less well at 
capturing the impacts relevant for a social cost-benefit calculation.
Customized and Sectoral Training
Customized training is defined as training characterized by 1) em-
ployer input and approval authority for the curriculum, 2) employer 
authority to establish eligibility criteria for participants and to select 
participants if the employer desires, and 3) a commitment by the em-
ployer to hire successful program completers. Sectoral training projects 
consist of customized employment and training services provided to a 
group of employers in the same industry or sector of the economy; see, 
e.g., Dresser and Rogers (1998) and Elliott and King (1999) for discus-
The Impacts of Workforce Investment Programs   169
sions. Though program advocates enthuse about these programs, they 
do so without good evidence regarding their impacts.
Sectoral programs, like OJT, have the potential to provide oppor-
tunities for human capital enhancement to disadvantaged workers who 
might be overlooked by employers. To warrant government support, 
more evidence is needed on their effectiveness in increasing earnings, 
and care should be taken to ensure that the training is provided to work-
ers who ordinarily would not be trained at employer expense. Thus, 
we recommend that rigorous evaluations be conducted to determine 
whether these programs produce earnings gains that exceed their (full 
social) costs. We further recommend that programs be structured so that 
workers who receive the training have labor market disadvantages, and 
so that the training is general in nature and useful at other firms in addi-
tion to the one hiring the workers.
ANALYTIC ISSUES
This section highlights the four most important analytic issues in 
the literature. 
The first concerns heterogeneity in the effects of active labor market 
policies. This heterogeneity arises in part from the fact that programs 
themselves often provide quite heterogeneous services under headings 
such as “classroom training.” The substantial differences across groups 
defined by sex and age in average treatment effects, noted earlier in 
the chapter, strongly suggest that even relatively homogeneous services 
will have varying effects across individuals as well. In such an environ-
ment, evaluation researchers must pay close attention to exactly what 
treatment effect their analysis estimates, and policy analysts must take 
care to link the estimates they consider to the policy questions of in-
terest. For example, an experiment with no control-group substitution 
estimates the mean impact of “treatment on the treated.” This mean 
impact represents the correct impact estimate for a cost-benefit analysis 
that seeks to address the question of either keeping or scrapping the 
existing program. It does not provide the correct impact estimate for 
an analysis of whether the program should receive a larger budget so 
as to allow it to expand the set of persons served; a simple economic 
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model of program participation in which those with the largest impacts 
choose to participate suggests that average impacts for individuals on 
the margin of service receipt will lie below the mean impact of treat-
ment on the treated.
Second, many studies do not even attempt a cost-benefit analysis, 
and those that do often provide relatively low-quality analyses, either 
because of lack of required inputs or failure to follow the best prac-
tices outlined in the literature. Without a serious cost-benefit analysis, 
even a relatively strong positive impact estimate has little to say about 
policy. Without data on all relevant outcomes (as when relying solely 
on administrative earnings data for outcomes when programs may also 
affect, say, criminal behavior and health), policymakers end up making 
decisions based on incomplete information about impacts. Many gov-
ernment programs lack even rudimentary information on either average 
or marginal program costs, let alone detailed information on the mar-
ginal and average costs for particular services and client types. Finally, 
as noted in Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999), many cost-benefit 
analyses fail to take full account of the costs of tax funding by omitting 
consideration of the marginal excess burden of taxation, and proceeding 
instead as if a dollar of tax funding costs society only a dollar.
Third, most evaluations estimate impacts over relatively short pe-
riods from the time of service initiation or random assignment. Recent 
evidence indicates the dangers this poses to correct inferences about 
program value. In the negative direction, the early positive impacts 
found in the National Job Corps Study turned out to largely fade away 
when longer-term follow-up data became available. In the positive di-
rection, classroom training sometimes takes several years to yield its full 
impact, as in the long-term follow-up of the California GAIN program 
by Hotz, Imbens, and Klerman (2006) and the long-term evaluation of 
German classroom training by Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2004). At 
the same time, the long-term follow-ups of the Supported Work experi-
ment by Couch (1992) and of the JTPA experiment in USGAO (1996) 
show that sometimes program impact estimates remain rock solid at the 
level observed shortly after program participation. With only a handful 
of studies that provide credible impact estimates more than two or three 
years out (this paragraph lists nearly all of them), we cannot draw any 
conclusions about program types or client characteristics associated 
with particular patterns of long-term impacts.
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Fourth, and finally, only a handful of papers look seriously at gen-
eral equilibrium effects. Put differently, most evaluations ignore the 
effects that programs may have on the behavior of those who do not 
participate in them. In addition to indirect effects working through the 
tax system, these include displacement effects, whereby individuals 
induced to search harder (or smarter) by a program, or whose skills 
increase as the result of a program, take jobs that would otherwise have 
gone to individuals not participating in the program. Programs can also 
have price effects; for example, a program that produces large numbers 
of trained auto mechanics or nurses’ aides should drive down wages in 
those labor markets. In many cases, failing to take account of general 
equilibrium effects leads to overly positive conclusions about program 
performance. 
Calmfors (1994) and Johnson (1980) provide early conceptual dis-
cussions of these issues. The small but growing empirical literature in-
cludes Davidson and Woodbury (1987), who find modest but not triv-
ial displacement effects of UI bonuses in a search context. Heckman, 
Lochner, and Taber (1999) find large price effects of a subsidy to univer-
sity tuition, effects that imply that a partial equilibrium analysis wildly 
overstates the enrollment effects of the subsidy. Lise, Seitz, and Smith 
(2006) consider the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project, which provided 
a generous earnings subsidy to some welfare recipients, and find that 
taking account of displacement and changes in the amount of effort ap-
plied to searching by those without the subsidy changes the sign of the 
cost-benefit calculation for the program. Finally, Kabbani (2001) finds 
evidence using data from the NJS that training programs may increase 
the earnings of nonparticipants by moving the participants into a differ-
ent labor market.
CONCLUSION
First, most employment and training programs have either no 
impact or modest positive impacts. Many do not pass careful social 
cost-benefit tests, though some that fail may be worth doing on equity 
grounds. Existing evaluations have important analytic limitations that 
bias them in favor of programs with short-term impacts and large spill-
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over effects on nonparticipants from displacement or price changes. In 
general, employment and training programs work best for adult women 
and least well for youth. The literature provides no good explanation for 
this demographic pattern.
For reasons of space we have omitted a variety of topics, such as 
recent studies that examine program design by looking at performance 
management systems (Barnow and Smith 2004; Heckman, Heinrich, 
and Smith 2002), at the efficacy of caseworkers (Bell and Orr 2002; 
McConnell, Decker, and Perez-Johnson 2006), and at statistical treat-
ment rules as an alternative to caseworkers (Eberts, O’Leary, and 
Wandner 2002; Lechner and Smith 2007). We have also omitted some 
program categories, such as welfare-to-work programs (Ashworth, 
Cebulla, Greenberg, and Walker 2004; Bloom, Hill, and Riccio 2003) 
and the Trade Adjustment Act as well as all evidence from outside the 
United States (Betcherman, Olivas, and Dar 2004; Kluve 2006). The 
general lessons from the omitted literature parallel those from what we 
have covered. 
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